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SECTION III 
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21 
Social Psychology 
Steven D. Brown and Abigail Locke 
INTRODUCTION 
Social Psychology remains a diverse sub-discipline of psychology. One that in its broadest conceptualisation 
contains feminist approaches, gender, community and political psychology, and critical approaches to the 
discipline, alongside more traditional social psychological approaches to group dynamics and attitude 
theory. The diversity of method and topic has characterised social psychology since its inception. Most 
traditional histories of social psychology single out two key works in the late nineteenth century as the 
founding moments for the discipline – Le Bon’s study of crowd behaviour and Triplett’s experimental 
research on social facilitation. Le Bon’s (1895) The Crowd is a dense ‘philosophical’ treatise on the ‘minds’ 
and ‘opinions’ of crowds. This is illustrated by observations the author makes on the events around the fall 
of the Paris Commune. In stark contrast, Triplett’s (1898) work is a more modest attempt to understand 
‘competitiveness’ – how the presence of others seems to encourage individuals to apply greater efforts in the 
accomplishment of some task. Whilst reference is made to bicycle racing competitions, Triplett’s work uses 
an experimental design where two children are engaged in a somewhat bizarrely staged task involving 
fishing reels. 
What is interesting about these two works is how very different they seem. Le Bon uses ‘real world’ 
examples, but only as a way of illustrating a theory of crowd behaviour he has already worked out in 
advance (i.e. a ‘deductive’ procedure). Triplett uses experimental data, but treats this data as a window onto 
‘natural laws’ which he does not know in advance (i.e. an ‘inductive procedure’). On another level, whilst 
Le Bon has a clear political position – ‘mobs’ are dangerous and need to be controlled by the state – Triplett 
seems to have very little sense of there being any link between the behaviour of individuals and the social 
and cultural milieu they live within. 
The point we want to make is that from its very inception social psychology has been a wildly diverse 
field. In formal terms it has veered between a taste for grand theorizing (e.g. Self-Categorization Theory) 
and a preference for pointing out small regularities in human behaviour (e.g. Fritz Heider’s work on errors 
and biases). In methodological terms it has embraced both large scale observational work (e.g. Festinger’s 
classic study When Prophecy Fails) and the design of highly intricate and at times controversial 
experimental settings (e.g. Zimbardo’s notorious Stanford Prison Experiment). And in political terms, social 
psychologists appear torn between making explicit statements (e.g. Tajfel’s work on categorization and 
prejudice) and denying that the political has any relevance to their individual research programmes (see 
Frances Cherry’s marvellous 1995 analysis of this tendency). 
In this chapter we want to show how qualitative methods fit into this very confusing and contradictory 
field. We will evaluate the place of qualitative methods according to the three criteria used above – formal, 
methodological, political. Or put slightly differently: what do qualitative researchers claim they are doing, 
how do they go about doing it and what do they see as the relevancy of their work? What we hope to show is 
that whilst qualitative methods do in many ways differ from the quantitative and experimental techniques 
which have dominated social psychology (notably US social psychology) over the past 60 years, these 
differences also mark some points of deep similarity. 
In the first part of the chapter we will put these differences and similarities in context by showing how 
two rival versions of ‘social psychology’ grew up in psychology and sociology. We will then describe how 
the so-called ‘crisis’ in European social psychology brought the two ‘social psychologies’ back into contact. 
In the main part of the chapter we then outline the different qualitative methods which were developed in 
(psychological) social psychology as a consequence of this renewed contact, and point to recent 
developments since the first edition of this handbook was published. By way of conclusion, we will assess 
the future prospects for qualitative methods in social psychology. At the end of the chapter we have included 
a worked example where we contrast the various approaches. 
THE TWO ‘SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIES’ 
In his historical work, Robert Farr (1995) points out that there are two distinct traditions of work which call 
themselves ‘social psychology’. One is the well-known branch of psychology which we have been 
describing. But there is a second and wholly separate branch of sociology also called ‘social psychology’. 
We will offer a brief characterization of each in turn. 
The first social psychology (or ‘psychological social psychology’) has its origins in European 
psychology. Historically, psychology in Europe has experienced considerable difficulty in establishing its 
place in the broader divisions of knowledge and academic life. The subject matter of psychology – human 
activity and mental life – suggests that psychology has its place amongst the humanities as a form 
‘Geisteswissenschaft’ (the study of culture). But European psychologists at the turn of the nineteenth century 
sought to align the fledgling discipline with the more powerful disciplines and faculties of medicine and 
exact science as a form of ‘Naturwissenschaft’ (the natural sciences). 
By and large, social psychology has followed the path of its parent discipline. Whilst early European 
work in social psychology (e.g. McDougall, 1925; Bartlett, 1932) explicitly drew upon work in other 
humanities such as anthropology, by the 1950s psychological social psychology was dominated by a natural 
science orientation towards experimentation and quantification. At the same time, the research agenda for 
the discipline was set by social psychologists based in the USA (such as Allport, Asch and Festinger). This 
dominance of North American research was further extended in the period immediately after the end of the 
second world war, when US finance and expertise was brought into Europe in an attempt to unify the 
research community split asunder by the turmoil of war years and the flight into exile of many former 
leading lights (such as Kurt Lewin and Fritz Heider). It was also hoped that this would serve as part of the 
intellectual buttress against communism that the USA was then desperate to enable in Western Europe. 
Between 1950 and 1975 it is fair to say that psychological social psychology was an experimental science 
dominated by the overarching model and ideology of North American psychology. 
In the case of the other social psychology (or ‘psychological sociology’), the situation is curiously 
reversed. This tradition emerged in US sociology, mostly around the ‘Chicago School’ which flourished 
around George Herbert Mead and his successors. Working within a discipline which is central to the study 
of culture, sociologists have traditionally not suffered from the same ‘identity problems’ which beset 
psychologists. They have instead been concerned with the best means to study ‘social forces’. Classically 
large samples of statistical data on, for example, suicide rates, household consumption patterns, voting 
preferences, have been the mainstay. These samples are used as the basis to impute regularities in social 
structure which are then ‘reproduced’ or ‘lived out’ by individuals who take on certain characteristics and 
viewpoints as a consequence (as in Max Weber’s ‘ideal-typical’ forms). This kind of approach reached its 
height in the functionalist system theory of Talcott Parsons in the 1950s. 
But a counter-trend in sociology has emphasized the importance of approaching social forces in a 
different direction, by looking at how individuals make meaning and sense out of the social structures they 
inhabit. The generic term for this approach is ‘micro-sociology’. Mead’s work, for example, emphasized that 
an individual’s personal understandings emerged through a kind of dialogue with the people and broader 
world around them or ‘symbolic interactionism’. Studying such understanding required the use of different 
methodologies, such as indepth interviewing, observation and ethnography. In the post-war period, this kind 
work was given additional impetus by the rediscovery of a branch of European philosophy called 
‘phenomenology’. Sociologists such as Alfred Schutz developed phenomenological terms such as 
‘lifeworld’ to show that whilst there may be general laws of society, at a micro level what matters is how 
persons interpret their world by drawing on local rules and rationalities. This insight was developed further 
in the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel (1967). Between 1950 and 1975 it is then more or less 
accurate to describe psychological sociology as a minority voice arguing against the overarching model of a 
quantitative structural-functionalism derived from classical European sociology. 
THE ‘CRISIS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY’ 
During the 1970s these two versions of social psychology unexpectedly came back into dialogue with one 
another. The period is usually referred to as ‘the crisis in social psychology’. It was sparked by the near 
simultaneous publication of three texts. 
In the USA, Kenneth Gergen’s article ‘Social Psychology as History’ (1973) presented a blistering attack 
on the dominant experimental model in social psychology. He noted that the reliance on supposedly value 
neutral ‘objective’ methods led social psychologists to be blind to the cultural and historical factors that 
shape social behaviour. He argued that to understand social processes we need to study how they have 
operated and changed over history – how social actions are fluid and dynamic – and how in particular the 
practices of social psychology have changed and adapted over time. Gergen’s attack was particularly 
powerful since the author had been trained in precisely those methods he attacked so virulently. 
Rom Harré and Paul Secord’s (1972) The Explanation of Social Behaviour argued against the 
‘mechanism’ of much contemporary psychology. The authors – both philosophers – took issue with the 
default model of the person used in psychology (notably behaviourism). This model suggested that 
individual behaviour was the product of generic features of human nature which were essentially beyond the 
control of the person. The task of the social psychologist was then to uncover these generic features through 
experimental investigation (i.e. through ‘positivism’). Harré and Secord argued instead for a model of 
persons as wholly rational, complex agents whose behaviour was a product of their own contemplation and 
attempts to understand their world. They pointed to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the symbolic 
interactionism of Mead and Erving Goffman as good examples. The task of the social psychologist would 
then be akin to that of an anthropologist, who would seek to discover the local rules in play in a given 
community and how these rules were interpreted by community members. 
In Europe, Israel and Tajfel (1972) edited a series of essays on The Context of Social Psychology, which 
similarly echoed the call to engage with wider social and cultural forces and to look beyond the narrow 
confines of experimentalism. Tajfel’s own contribution (‘Experiments in a vacuum’) neatly summarized the 
dangers that resulted from treating social psychological experiments as ends in themselves rather than as the 
starting point for developing propositions about social behaviour which would then have to be refined in 
dialogue with other social sciences. More seriously, this edited book reflected a sense on the part of many 
European social psychologists that US research had achieved such a level of dominance that it was able to 
erroneously assume that it provided universal insights into general human nature, rather than very specific 
insights about North American culture. The formation of a distinctive European Association for 
Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP) was then an attempt to ‘reclaim’ a form of social psychology 
uniquely suited to European cultures and societies. The EAESP also opened up dialogue with social 
psychologists in the USSR and Eastern Bloc states, where very different kinds of psychology were being 
pursued, which emphasized collectivity and materialism over individualism and cognitivism. 
All three texts then echoed one another’s call for a change in the formal, methodological and political 
basis on which social psychology was to be conducted. The ‘crisis’ which subsequently followed involved a 
great deal of public debate about the strength and weaknesses of these arguments and about what the 
implications might be of putting these changes into practice. It was within this context that a number of 
qualitative approaches became adopted. We will refer to these as the ‘first wave’ of qualitative methods. 
THE ‘FIRST WAVE’: 1975–1990 
The key texts of the crisis literature had all called for change in social psychology. To some extent 
‘experiments’ became seen as emblematic of all that was wrong with the discipline. The search for new 
methods then became at the same time shorthand for doing social psychology differently. However, the 
majority of the crisis literature proved to be very thin in terms of specific recommendations for appropriate 
methodologies. This left a generation of researchers in the unfortunate position of being ‘against’ 
experiments but with little sense of the alternatives (i.e. what they were actually ‘for’). In the late 1970s the 
‘ethogenic’ and ‘hermeneutic’ approaches came to fill this void, followed in the mid-1980s by Q-
methodology and discourse analysis. 
Ethogenics 
The ‘crisis’ created a schism in the UK social psychology community. This was demonstrated most starkly 
at Oxford University in the early 1970s where two versions of social psychology were pursued in parallel. 
Based in the Department of Experimental Psychology, Michael Argyle worked out a programme of research 
in interpersonal behaviour using classic experimental paradigms. Literally up the road, at Lineacre College, 
Rom Harré worked out an alternative version of social psychology based around what he termed 
‘ethogenics’. In formal terms, ethogenics is an attempt to develop an empirical programme for social 
psychology along the lines of the ‘philosophical anthropology’ promoted by Wittgenstein. Crudely this 
means uncovering the local, culturally specific ‘rules of production’ which persons draw upon to render their 
world meaningful. As Parker (1989: 21) and others have noted, ethogenics has three main principles: ‘the 
idea of an expressive order; a description of that order as drama; an understanding of social rules’. 
According to Harré, social life can be divided into two very different realms – a ‘practical order’ which 
covers physical needs and the actions which are required to satisfy them, and an ‘expressive order’ which 
covers social needs such as self-esteem. It is this latter realm which is the proper subject matter for social 
psychology. Harré argues that the expressive order is best approached through the ‘dramaturgical model’ of 
social life developed by Goffman, amongst others. This model sees social behaviour as akin to a 
‘performance’ which social actors must learn to acquire in order to successfully accomplish various 
activities. These performances are in turn governed by local rules which establish what can be counted as 
‘proper’ and ‘improper’ acts. For example, in Marsh, Rosser and Harré’s (1978) study of football 
hooliganism, the focus is on the ‘moral careers’ of football fans. Here becoming a football fan is seen as a 
complex dramaturgical performance, where individuals have to learn the ‘social rules’ which govern fan 
behaviour (e.g. showing the ‘right’ amount of aggression, but also knowing the limits). The data for the 
study were drawn from participant observation along with interviews with fans. As a consequence the 
researchers faced the immediate problem that there appeared to be a gap between how fans described their 
behaviour at football matches, emphasizing their own violent conduct, and the actual behaviour typically 
seen at such events. Marsh et al. resolved this by claiming that fans improve their own standing as 
‘hooligans’ by colluding in the pretence that football violence is disorderly when they are aware, in some 
sense, that actually their behaviour follows social rules. The broader and somewhat conservative political 
point that Marsh et al. make is that ultimately social life consists of rule-following, although it is often useful 
for individuals to deny this to themselves, in order to feel like free, creative agents (see Parker, 1989). 
Whilst many of the core principles underpinning the ethogenic approach have been taken up across a 
variety of approaches – not least in discursive psychology – the term itself was not broadly adopted, and 
Harré replaced it with the alternative general formulation ‘the second cognitive revolution’ in the early 
1990s (Van Langenhove, 2010; see also Harré & Gillett, 1994). The historical importance of ethogenics for 
social psychology is that its clear formulation of the methodological importance of concepts from ordinary 
language philosophy and microsociology, and in no small measure through the association with formidable 
intellectual and professional standing of Harré himself, enabled it to serve as a ‘latch lifter’ into the 
discipline for many of the qualitative approaches that would follow. 
Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is a philosophical tradition concerned with the reading and interpretation of texts, typically 
sacred works such as the Jewish Talmud or the Christian Bible. The fundamental principle of hermeneutics 
is that the meaning of a text is interrelated with the historical conditions and local practices in which the text 
is constituted. Since these conditions and practices are not available in the same way to readers as time 
passes, they must be ‘reconstructed’ in order to uncover the layers of meaning which the text acquires (i.e. 
the Talmud as it is read by contemporary readers is the product of centuries of interpretative traditions which 
are ‘layered’ on top of one another). In the late 1970s, John Shotter, working as a developmental 
psychologist in the experimental psychology department at the University of Nottingham, saw a new way of 
applying hermeneutics to psychological data. Shotter worked with video recordings of mother–infant 
interactions. Traditionally, developmental psychologists would ‘read’ the behaviour of infants and mothers 
by drawing on existing theories, such as Piagetian structuraldevelopment theory. For Shotter, this was rather 
like the situation where a reader interprets a novel or a scripture in their own terms without paying any 
attention to the context in which the text was itself written. The hermeneutic approach would then 
reconstruct the context in which the behaviour of mother and infant makes sense to one another, rather than 
‘reading’ their behaviour through an external theory. Shotter’s work attempted to develop theories of ‘play’ 
and ‘maternal interaction’ from the bottom up by reconstructing the context of behaviour in this hermeneutic 
fashion (Shotter and Gregory, 1976). 
Gergen, Fisher and Hepburn (1986) extended this work by observing that social psychologists fail to 
appreciate how their own methods and measures may themselves be interpreted. Gergen et al. asked student 
participants to look at items drawn from the Rotter locus of control scale which had been randomly assigned 
to a variety of personality traits. Participants were able to make highly articulate claims about why each item 
might plausibly be seen as evidence of a particular personality, despite the fact that the associations were 
entirely random. Gergen et al. claimed that this demonstrated the sophisticated ways in which persons could 
reconstruct contexts to make these links meaningful. The political point here is that academic psychology is 
just one hermeneutic practice amongst others. It is a way of ‘reading’ behaviour, but one which fails to 
recognize that the particular interpretations it makes are just that – rather partial and limited readings based 
upon a reconstruction of context.  
Much as with the ethogenic approach, the term hermeneutics did not given rise to a specific 
methodological toolkit. However Shotter’s strong body of conceptual work demonstrating the importance of 
philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, Vico and many others (see Shotter, 1984; 1993a; 1993b) has a 
continuing relevance and influence (e.g. Corcoran & Cromby, 2016). Equally important is the ongoing 
recognition that the central hermeneutic practice of ‘intepretation’ is shared across all qualitative methods, 
despite the tendency to overlook some of the thorny philosophical difficulties that arise from taking 
interpretation seriously (see Willig, 2012). Some researchers, such as Langdridge (2007), have argued that 
the best means of rigorously approaching issues around interpretation in qualitative data is to return to the 
phenomenological methods and strategies proposed by Husserl and Heidegger.  
Q-methodology 
As we have seen in the case of hermeneutics, many social psychologists who looked towards qualitative 
methods in the late 1970s and early 1980s were working in traditional departments of psychology where 
experimental methods were dominant. At the University of Reading, Rex Stainton Rogers had also 
developed a hermeneutic approach to personality testing (Semin and Rogers, 1973). Stainton Rogers was 
similarly concerned with showing that the interpretative powers of ordinary persons far exceeded the rather 
limited models used by social psychologists, but was also concerned with the means by which this could be 
systematically demonstrated through a method capable of representing the complex structure of lay or 
everyday interpretations. In order to capture this, Stainton Rogers drew on the notion of ‘operant 
subjectivity’ (see Brown, 1980) originally devised by William Stephenson (Chapter 13). Stephenson had 
treated ‘personality’ as a constellation of possible opinions and responses which a person might make, 
whose precise form shifted according to the context in which the person found themselves. Hence at any 
given moment someone’s expressed (or ‘operant’) position on a topic represents a conscious choice (hence 
‘subjectivity’) out of a range of possible positions. The task of the social psychologist is then to map the 
contours of this constellation, in relation to specific issues and concerns, and to demonstrate how persons 
shift between positions. 
Stephenson had developed an unusual written statement sorting task called a ‘Q-sort’ as a device for 
capturing operant subjectivity. In collaboration with Wendy Stainton Rogers, Q-methodology was 
developed into a social psychological technique. Studies were conducted ranging from expressed 
subjectivity in relation to politics (R. Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger, 1985), health (W. Stainton Rogers, 
1991) and emotions (Stenner and R. Stainton Rogers, 1998). Some of the best known work in this tradition 
is Celia Kitzinger’s (1987) studies of lesbian identities. Kitzinger used Q-methodology as a way of sampling 
the diversity of possible ways in which lesbianism might be ‘constructed’ (that is, described and understood) 
ranging from sexual identity as personal preference to radical lesbianism as a strategic political choice. Q-
methodology, as developed by the Stainton Rogers, was a curious mix of the old and the very new. Q-sorts 
themselves resemble traditional personality techniques, and indeed are in part quantitatively analysed. But 
since they allow for a vast number of possible connections to be made between statements, Q-sorts are able 
to reveal extremely complex interpretative structures and define the differences between distinct structures. 
Moreover these structures are themselves interpreted as cultural and historical artefacts (see Curt, 1994). To 
this extent Q-methodology is seen as compatible with ‘social constructionism’. 
One of the obstacles to the broader adption of Q-methodology was the widespread suspicion aroused by 
its quantitative aspects. To some extent, the development of mixed-methods research and growing 
recognition of the qualitative/interpretative uses that can be made of quantitative data (as with so-called ‘big 
data’) has allowed Q-methodology to thrive (see Watts & Stenner, 2012). Although it remains a relatively 
under-represented approach within social psychology, it is one of the few qualitative methodologies 
developed with the discipline to have been adopted without substantive modification in other areas of social 
science (see for example Baker et al 2014). 
Discourse analysis 
The seminal text that brought discourse analysis into social psychology was Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) 
Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour, coming near the end of the first wave of 
qualitative methods. Discourse analysis as both a theoretical stance and a methodological perspective had a 
basis in sociology, in particular Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) work in the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK), which had originally formulated the idea of interpretative repertoires (discrete sets of rhetorical 
formulations and concepts organized around a core metaphor) which Potter and Wetherell put at the heart of 
their version of discourse analysis. The method was promoted as a way of re-interpreting the subject matter 
of psychology itself, beginning in this instance with attitudes, but extended in later years to topics such as 
motives and intentions, emotions and cognition and memory. Formally, discourse analysis shared with all 
the other first wave methods the ambition of treating psychological processes as flexible, sophisticated 
everyday practices through which persons made sense of their social worlds. Methodologically, the 
approach insisted (as sociologists like Garfinkel had done) that rather than search for the supposed ‘causes’ 
of behaviour, social scientists ought to look at the rational ‘accounts’ persons give of their own conduct. 
Potter and Wetherell claimed that since discourse analysis involved the close scrutiny of language, then 
any ‘text’ was potentially analysable in this way. However in practice much of their data was derived from 
interviews (notably a study of racism in New Zealand, published as Wetherell and Potter, 1992) or from 
easily transcribed sources such as television programmes or newspaper articles. Discourse analysis differed 
from the other first wave approaches by taking a ‘hard-line’ approach to language. Whilst the other 
approaches had prioritized language use as the public means through which meaning and understanding is 
organized, they had nevertheless retained a role for traditional concepts such as historical and social forces, 
and even for cognition itself. Potter and Wetherell claimed that it was possible to ‘bracket out’ all such 
factors – in particular mental phenomena – since they could demonstrate that social life could be analysed as 
it is organized through language and conversational interaction entirely without reference to any other 
process. This resulted in an almost immediate backlash against the approach from both psychologists and 
sociologists who saw discourse analysis as offering little to their respective projects. More importantly it 
resulted in the charge that discourse analysis was politically impotent, since it could not offer analyses of 
large scale social and historical processes.  
As we will go on to describe, the majority of researchers within this tradition moved away from the 
version of Discourse Analysis articulated by Potter & Wetherell (1987). But the core methodological ideas 
continue to be in current use in other disciplines. For example, within management and organization studies, 
the ‘discursive approach’ is constituted almost entirely by the use of interviews which are analysed in terms 
of rhetoric, metaphor and interpretative repertoires (see Steyaert et al 2016; Grant et al, 2004; Watson, 
1994). 
THE ‘SECOND WAVE’: 1990–2005 
By the late 1980s, a range of qualitative techniques had begun to appear in social psychology. The common 
thread shared by all techniques was a commitment to a model of persons as sophisticated language users 
able to flexibly interpret and understand their social worlds. At the same time, the researchers using these 
techniques were engaged in a wholesale rejection of experimental methods and indeed, to some extent, the 
discipline that went with it. By the early 1990s, however, the range of qualitative techniques in use and the 
growing tradition of studies made it a very real prospect to talk of a ‘qualitative social psychology’. One 
crucial marker was the decision by the British Psychological Society to include the teaching of qualitative 
methods as a compulsory requirement in all UK psychology undergraduate degree programmes which it 
accredited. By the turn of the millennium, qualitative social psychological studies routinely featured in 
mainstream journals such as British Journal of Social Psychology and Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology as well as specialist journals such Discourse & Society. Whilst techniques such as Q 
methodology remained vibrant, the ‘second wave’ of methods mostly focused on the technical analysis of 
discourse, but with very different aims. 
Discursive psychology 
The application of discourse analysis to the study of psychological phenomena picked up speed in the early 
1990s. Much of the work in this area came from a group of researchers in and around Loughborough 
University in the UK including Michael Billig, Derek Edwards, Jonathan Potter, Margaret Wetherell and 
Charles Antaki, who collaborated as the Discourse & Rhetoric Group (DARG). The term ‘discursive 
psychology’ was coined in a 1992 book by Edwards and Potter, who extended the hardline stance of Potter 
and Wetherell. Whereas Discourse and Social Psychology had merely suggested the bracketing of mental 
process, Edwards and Potter aimed to show how the entirety of social psychology (and much of psychology 
to boot) could be reconstructed as the study of talk-in-interaction. In doing so, Edwards and Potter were 
effectively repeating the similar provocation which Harvey Sacks made to sociologists by claiming that the 
social order could only be empirically recovered through the analysis of ordinary, mundane conversational 
interactions. Psychological strongholds such as memory and cognition (Middleton and Edwards, 1990; 
Lynch and Bogen, 1996), emotions (Edwards, 1997, 1999; Locke and Edwards, 2003), attributions 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992) and identity (Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995; Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998) 
were subject to a thorough reworking from a discursive point of view, with the result that ascriptions of 
mental states were considered for their role as interactional currency. 
The focus of discursive psychology changed over the period from 1990 to 2005. In 1992, the focus was 
on fact construction, stake management and accountability (see also Potter (1996) for work along these 
lines) encompassed in the (decidedly ironic) construction of the Discourse Action Model (DAM), published 
in the heartland of mainstream psychology, Psychological Review. A more comprehensive account of 
discursive psychology was provided in Edwards (1997), where the influence of conversation analysis is 
more firmly felt, and more recently in Edwards and Potter (2005) whereby three overlapping strands of 
discursive psychology are outlined. These ranged from a discursive reworking of traditional psychological 
models, to looking at the interactional uses of psychological terms, and finally studying where psychological 
states are implied in discourse. Here the study of talk-in-interaction in its own right is seen to not merely 
revolutionize social psychology, but to potentially do away with the need for the discipline at all. Indeed by 
2005, Wooffitt (2005: 129) was given to note that ‘on occasions it would seem that the methodology of 
discursive psychology is hard to distinguish from that of CA’ (see also Silverman (2006) for similar 
sentiments). In other words, discursive psychology had become, for many, a branch of conversation analysis 
(Chapter 4). This is reflected in the increasing ‘ratcheting up’ of the methodological standards of discursive 
psychology, such that by the mid-1990s, interviews and focus group material were of interest merely as 
peculiar interactional settings with the use of naturally occurring data considered as the gold standard (see 
Puchta and Potter, 2004; Potter and Hepburn, 2005). For critics of the approach, the political questions of 
what exactly a fine-grained attention to transcripts of conversation adds to analysis of pressing social and 
political questions remains ever more pertinent. The debate as to the actual differences between much of the 
work coming under the labels of discursive psychology or conversation analysis (aside from one method 
being mainly used by psychologists and the other by mainly sociologists)  continues on  (see Wooffitt, 2005; 
Edwards, 2006; Kitzinger, 2006; Potter, 2006, 2012).  ). 
Foucauldian discourse analysis 
In the late 1970s a group of psychologists and sociologists began publishing a journal Ideology & 
Consciousness which explicitly aimed to develop the ideas of the French philosopher Michel Foucault in 
relation to psychology. In a series of articles (e.g. Adlam, Henriques, Rose, Salfield, Venn and Walkerdine, 
1977) they argued that since our thinking is intertwined with the historical development of social practice 
and state power, it follows that our self-reflections on what we ourselves are (or ‘subjectivity’) is similarly 
structured. Hence the entirety of psychology must be considered from the perspective of the power 
mechanisms and structured modes of thinking with which they are associated (or ‘discourses’ for shorthand) 
that have made us what we are. Nikolas Rose developed this approach most extensively (see Rose, 1985, 
1989). The critical question then is – how does power produce subjectivity and how might we develop new 
forms of subjectivity that resist power (see Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine, 1984)? In a 
piece of subsequent work, Wendy Hollway (1989) proposed an approach to the analysis of interview texts 
which would focus on the ‘subject positions’ that discourses allowed persons to adopt. This approach gave 
rise, in part, to what is sometimes called ‘Foucauldian discourse analysis’ (FDA).. 
In truth there is no clear set of methodological principles which unites work in the FDA tradition, beyond 
the common use of the term ‘discourse’ to refer to those understanding which are made available by a 
particular social practice existing within a given field of power. The work of Ian Parker and Erica Burman 
(collaborating as the Discourse Unit at Manchester Metropolitan University) has contributed most to the 
development of this approach (see Parker and Burman, 1994; Parker and the Bolton Discourse Network, 
1999). Parker and Burman insist that since power subsumes the entirety of any social world one can analyse 
practically any material, from government reports to interviews with professionals through even 
(notoriously!) to the instructions on a tube of children’s toothpaste (see Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor 
and Tindall, 1989), for evidence of the ‘subject positions’ we are forced to adopt to understand ourselves. 
However, for the most part, FDA work tends to be interview based, and broadly resembles the approach 
taken in early discursive psychological work. But it differs through its commitment to locating the analysis 
within a broader social theoretical framework derived from Foucault’s work. During the 1990s there was a 
series of fiercely argued exchanges between the Discourse Unit and DARG members, with the former 
arguing that the latter had reneged on any sense of the political, which was met with the counter-charge that 
FDA was methodologically unsophisticated and unable to provide the empirical evidence for the political 
claims its authors wished to make (Parker, 1990, 1999; Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards, 1990; Potter, 
Edwards and Ashmore, 1999). 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis 
One way of considering all of the qualitative work in the ‘second wave’ is to see it as the renewal of social 
psychology by sociological thinking. Thus discursive psychology took inspiration from the sociology of 
accounts (e.g. Garfinkel) and conversation analysis (e.g. Sacks) and FDA drew heavily on then previous 
sociological interpretation of Foucault’s work (e.g. Turner, 1996; Rose, 1989). There was one other major 
sociological tradition which influenced social psychologists – the ‘grounded theory’ approach developed by 
Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser. Grounded theory is a method which aims to provide a systematic 
process for inductively deriving ‘categories’ which can be developed into coherent theories. It demands that 
researchers minutely break down the transcript of an interview into tiny fragments of meaning (or ‘codes’) 
which are then assembled into broader ‘themes’. This process is repeated for every interview, with themes 
being continually revised, until the researcher feels that the themes properly capture the substance of what 
participants are describing. 
Despite its widespread use in sociology, few psychologists have attempted to adopt grounded theory in its 
entirety (see Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992; Pidgeon, 1996; Chamberlain, 1999 for exceptions). However 
Jonathan A. Smith did develop, along with collaborators, an approach which was broadly in line with the 
spirit and general approach of grounded theory, but which placed far less constraints on the researcher, and 
which as a consequence could be readily taught to undergraduate and postgraduate students. Interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) works with texts, usually transcripts of interviews with carefully selected 
participants. It requires researchers to make notes on the transcript, then to systematize these notes into 
‘themes’ which are then clustered together and subsequently compared across interviews to form ‘master 
themes’. IPA work grew rapidly in the late 1990s, dealing mostly with health related themes (e.g. sexual 
health, chronic pain, maternity). One impetus for its growth was the promise that it was possible to treat the 
texts that it studies as ‘windows’ onto participants’ cognitions. In this sense it is ‘phenomenological’. 
However such cognitions are inevitably mediated by both language and by the interpretive role of the 
analyst. In this sense the approach is ‘hermeneutic’. But as critics (e.g. Willig, 2001) came to note, this view 
of language is not especially phenomenological, since phenomenologists have a radically different view of 
thinking from cognitive psychologists. Moreover, the hermeneutic aspect of the approach rather pales in 
comparison with the wholesale attempt to reconstruct context in first wave hermeneutics and second wave 
FDA. In the last half decade, IPA has found its home as a popular qualitative analysis in mainstream health 
psychology work,, 
 CONTEMPORARY WORK: 2005 onwards 
In this third wave of qualitative research in social psychology, the dominant approaches in social psychology 
are versions of ‘discourse analysis’ and versions of ‘grounded theory’. Discursive psychology, Critical 
Discursive Psychology and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis remain the best examples of the former, whilst 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, Psychosocial Research and the newly emerging Thematic 
Analysis remain as the most common instances of the latter, linking to the strength of grounded theory 
methodology across the rest of the Social Sciences (e.g. Charmaz, 2013).  However, there is a further 
division between a concern with ‘interaction’ and that with ‘experience’ that transcends the two approaches 
and connects to a broader renewed agenda around process, affect and materialism across the social sciences 
(see Wetherell, 2012).  
In general, qualitative work in social psychology seems, with some notable exceptions such as Conversation 
Analysis and some Discursive Psychology, to be becoming more heterogeneous and diversified rather than 
homogeneous and methodologically ‘purist’. Researchers have continued to adapt and modify many of the  
qualitative methodologies outlined in the first and second wave as they grappled with both their strengths 
and limitations.  In this section we will point to some the defining features of contemporary qualitative 
research in social psychology. 
Thematic analyses 
Thematic analyses have been around for a long time in a variety of forms, particularly, for example, in 
health psychology. Traditionally thematic analysis shared close links with content analysis in that both were  
concerned purely with topic rather than social action (see Miles & Huberman, 1994; Boyatzis (1998). More 
recently work by Braun & Clarke (2013) and Joffe & Yardley (2004) has revivified work using a thematic 
analytic approach by highlighting its links to the kind of constructionism found in early Discourse Analysis.  
In such methods, topics of concern are noted by going through the data, typically line by line, such that these 
topics can then be placed into larger categories or themes and sub-themes. As Braun & Clarke (2006) note, 
the themes that are produced can be either inductive or deductive and can be taken to reflect broader 
discursive structures. Deductive coding would be where the researcher codes the data in the light of a 
previous theoretical model. Once the theming of data has occurred, it is typical to compare coding with 
others in order to obtain inter-rater reliability. 
One reason why thematic analyses came back into vogue is arguably that they are able to sidestep tricky 
epistemological concerns. Such thematic analyses are particularly useful for those qualitative researchers 
who operate within an applied and practical domain and want to analyse their qualitative data for topic 
content without considering any methodological horrors (Woolgar, 1988). Their continued existence, and 
now resurgence, is arguably a product of a desire by researchers not to become enmeshed in the formal 
epistemological concerns which have marked much of the debate around first wave and second wave 
methods, and also part of an  attempt to deliver straightforward answers to complex social psychological 
questions. Thematic methodologies also enable researchers to combine qualitative and quantitative research 
– often seemingly without question. However, as some researchers have noted (e.g. Wood and Kroger, 
2000) such analyses can be considered as being more quantitative than qualitative in nature and spirit, and 
adopt what Kidder and Fine (1987) have called a ‘little q’ perspective on research. That said, the detailed 
outlining of thematic analysis by Braun & Clarke (2013) suggested that thematic analysis was a method of 
data coding that could be taken into a variety of theoretical perspectives, meaning that in terms of the 
interactionist/experiential divide, papers writing from both perspectives could use thematic analysis as the 
starting point for this enterprise..  
Psychosocial Research 
The hope of a dialogue between the two forms of social psychology is that it will be possible for to create a 
genuinely ‘social’ version of psychology. The psychosocial approach developed by Stephen Frosh (Chapter 
7), along with other researchers such as Anne Phoenix and Wendy Hollway starts from the same assumption 
as practically all qualitative methods in social psychology, that thinking and action are shaped by society 
and culture. But it grafts onto this the notion from psychodynamic theory that unconscious dynamics are a 
key motivational factor, albeit one that is in continuous dialogue with social forces. In practice what this 
means is viewing persons as shifting between different ‘subject positions’ in ‘discourse’, rather in the same 
way that Foucauldian discourse analysis proposes, in which they ‘invest’ unconsciously. Hollway and 
Jefferson’s (2000) Free Association Interview technique is the most coherent methodological example of the 
approach, drawing upon psychodynamic theory by making the relationship between the interviewer and 
interviewee central. The feelings and associations produced by the interviewer (what psychoanalysts usually 
call ‘countertransference’) are seen to be analytically significant. Methodologically this is problematic, not 
least because all of the first and second wave approaches were united in their rejection of any form of ‘depth 
psychology’ (i.e. claims to read unconscious processes in empirical material). 
An alternative dialect of psychosocial research has been proposed by discursive researchers such as Mick 
Billig (1999), who have proposed alternative ways that Freudian concepts might be used to enrich 
conversation and discourse analysis. Margie Wetherell (2012) has also outlined how ideas around interaction 
and practice, associated with the discourse approach, can be mobilised to study emotional investments as 
‘affective practices’. Paul Stenner’s work draws upon process philosophy, notably the work of A.N. 
Whitehead, to similarly sketch out a non-psychoanalytic approach to researching experience (Stenner, 2014; 
Stenner & Moreno, 2013). To date, neither dialect of psychosocial research has arguably really delivered on 
its initial promise. As with other movements in social psychology, such as ethogenics, it may be that the 
concepts developed here become more important in the longer term than the consolidation of the approach 
itself. 
Conversation analysis 
Conversation analysis (CA) is certainly not a new methodology, nor is it a new discovery for social 
psychologists (Edwards published a comprehensive introduction in 1994!). As we have described, 
conversation analysis has been critical to the development of discourse analysis and discursive psychology. 
However, as we have also noted, some social psychologists now regard themselves as having become 
conversation analysts, and correspondingly see social psychology itself as having its legitimate destination 
in this approach. The initial ideas of CA were developed by Harvey Sacks up until his death in 1975 (see 
Sacks, 1992) and have since been developed into a more concrete methodology by names such as Emmanuel 
Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Sacks’ original work proposed a conversation analysis that looked at both the 
sequential components of talk and the categories that were utilized in talk (membership category devices). 
Interestingly in the years since his death, this second focus has developed into what some would regard as a 
separate methodology of membership category analysis (MCA) one which is sometimes, though not always, 
tied to (sequential) CA. Mostly when people talk about using CA, they are referring to the sequential 
analysis of typically naturally occurring conversation. 
Current work in social psychology engages with a range of themes from CA, including the use of 
conversational markers in managing ‘psychological business’ (Wiggins, 2012), the concern with the 
interactional organisation of everday practices (Speer, 2012) and the situated epistemics which constitute 
social psychological phenomenon (Potter, 2012). Perhaps the most interesting development has been 
Elizabeth Stokoe’s applied work (Stokoe & Stikveland, 2016) which has developed an intervention and 
training package for improving professional and workplace communication, based on CA/Discursive 
Psychology principles, which dispels the argument that qualitative social psychological research lacks ‘real 
world’ applications. 
CA research within social psychology remains a relatively small field, albeit highly vibrant, populated 
mainly by current members and alumni of the Loughborough Discourse & Rhetoric Group. Despite the 
occasional heated exchange as to methodological and philosophical ambitions of CA-influenced Discursive 
Psychology (see Potter, 2012), the approach has carved out its own distinctive niche within social 
psychology seems likely to continue to develop its highly particular research programme for some time.   
Critical Discursive analyses 
Discursive methodologies in a variety of guises have been part of the qualitiative movement in psychology 
from the start. As we noted earlier, this began with Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) discourse analysis, which, in 
some quarters, was developed into discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992: Wiggins & Potter, 
2008).  However, whilst some went down a discursive psychology route, others developed discursive 
approaches that were able to answer the questions that they wanted to ask from the data. It is becomingly 
increasingly common to see work using ideas derived from Potter and Wetherell’s version of discourse 
analysis married with a concern with power that is close to Parker and Burman’s notion of discourse. One 
such way in the continual developing of critical discursive psychology (e.g. Wetherell & Edley, 2014) . This 
is a form of discursive analysis  that provides a synthesis of other approaches and is one that utilises s 
principles from both wider (conversation analytically inspired) discursive psychology (e.g. Wiggins & 
Potter, 2008) and post-structuralist Foucauldian-inspired Discourse Analysis (e.g. Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008), as such framing discourse, language and action as being socially situated (Burr, 2015). A 
critical discursive analysis enables a typically wider examination of the data looking at what is being 
constructed by the participants, how is this being done in the interaction, and what this tells us about wider 
societal ideologies. This work has been applied to topics such as masculinity and identity (e.g Wetherell & 
Edley, 2014)  and parenting cultures (Locke, 2015).   Another way in which discursive methodologies have 
been broadened includes the use of Multi-Modal Discourse Analysis (Machin, 2013) where the focus 
becomes on analysing different forms of communication and not just language (e.g.  Moran & Lee, 2013). 
These newer forms of discursive methodologies operate alongside the traditional discursive psychology, 
discourse analysis and Foucauldian discourse analysis outlined earlier in this chapter.  
Another stream of broadly Post-Foucauldian analysis has continued to develop alongside this wider 
discursive analysis. Post-Foucauldian analysis is not so much an approach as a body of research united in the 
ambition to study what it means to be a person and how this is rapidly changing in the complex geopolitics 
of the early twenty-first century. Methodologically, most work in this area is highly varied (and thus not 
systematic or refined with respect to common criteria) drawing equally on interviews, naturalistic data, and 
increasingly internet based data. However, politically the work shares the common perspective that it is the 
duty of the social researcher to invent concepts which not only capture the vicissitudes of contemporary life 
but also create new possibilities for thinking that life. This work emerged due to social psychologist’s 
delicate  placing within both the discipline of psychology and the wider social sciences.  
  
SUMMARY 
From a perspective of over 30 years onwards, we may now see that what the ‘crisis’ achieved for social 
psychology was twofold. Firstly, it enabled social psychologists to consider the cultural and historical 
constraints and influences on its ideas and theories. Secondly, it enabled a more ecologically valid study of 
people in their natural environments, explaining and accounting for their actions and decisions. This was 
accomplished through introduction and flourishing of a range of qualitative methods, over three successive 
waves. However, it is important to note that this only one half of the story. Experimental social psychology 
not only survived the crisis more or less intact, but is currently ‘in a state of rude health’ (Brown, 2002: 70). 
Indeed journals such as the European Journal of Social Psychology publish experimental work almost 
exclusively, reflecting a broader picture in northern Europe (with the exception of the UK), where social 
psychology is formally defined as much the same quantitative study of ‘social cognition’ that it has been 
since the 1950s. 
Should we then conclude that the situation in the UK is a special case, and if so, what are the implications 
of this exceptionality? There continue to be occasional sharp exchanges between the ‘qualitative’ and 
‘experimental’ camps within the discipline, particularly around issues such as what should be the priorities 
for national research funding (e.g. by the Economic and Social Research Council) during the times of 
ongoing economic and political austerity. But at the same time, there have been an equal number of 
initiatives aimed at building dialogue across methodological divisions, such as the working group set up by 
the British Psychological Society (BPS) in 2004 (see the special issue of The Psychologist of 2005 on 
‘Dialoguing Across Divisions’).  
For the most part the situation now seems to be that of the parallel existence of two ways of doing social 
psychology which pursue their own distinct research agendas, topics, methods and audiences. Occasionally 
these two worlds intersect, such as at the BPS Social Psychology Section Annual Conference, or within the 
pages of the British Journal of Social Psychology. Yet within both camps, there is a similar sense that in 
comparison with significant debates and transformation of the field during the first and, to a lesser extent, 
the second waves, contemporary work has settled into the comfortable patterns of research and moderate 
innovation that the philosopher Thomas Kuhn (1962) once described as ‘normal science’. This is by no 
means a bad thing for a discipline that had previously been absorbed in seeming ‘perpetual crisis’. Business 
as usual can be a more productive in research terms that ongoing epistemic and methodological 
disagreement. Yet at a conference held at the London School of Economics in 2015 on ‘The Vision of Social 
Psychology’ it was striking how many of the senior figures within the field who spoke had been in place 
since the first wave. The voices of the next generations of researchers were confined to the audience. The 
mirroring of the circumstances that led to that first crisis are clear. Whether this will result in new, 
revolutionary methodological developments is rather less so. 
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